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Introduction
Vicente Fox taking office as the first non-PRI president on December 1, 2000 was
a watershed in Mexican politics. On the one hand, it meant the beginning of a
transformation of the political regime, which had been dominated by a non-dem-
ocratic political tradition and a political class without a coherent long-term polit-
ical project. Mexico was a country with a closed political system, controlled by a
one-party regime, and with a relatively authoritarian order. Therefore, a compre-
hensive political transition was needed to make institutional change and the con-
solidation of new democratic rules possible. Hence, the new administration was the
crystallization of a long struggle to create the essential conditions for turning Mexico
into a modern democratic nation. The purpose of this was, in the first place, to secure
the values embraced by liberal democracy through modernization, and, secondly, to
guarantee that progress within the framework of this broad political development
would bring about the climate needed to create the basis for the economic opportu-
nities required to achieve the prosperity postponed for almost three decades.
Within this framework, in the past, bothMexico’s domestic political climate and its
interaction abroad had been quite rigid. Domestic change in Mexico occurred
alongside neo-globalization,2 particularly taking into account the international com-
munity’s widespread demand for radical democratic change in Mexican politics,
and the final outcome of moving toward the country’s democratic renovation. At
the same time, the challenge of both political and economic modernization requir-
ed that Mexico transform the polity and the economy to maintain the balance
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between the need for a historic domestic change and the prevailing international
reality. To a great extent, this expectation was fulfilled by deepening the domestic
political process, placing Mexico in a decisive stage on the path of economic mod-
ernization and political progress.
For better or for worse, globalization represented both an opportunity and a
challenge for Mexico, since ostensibly the opening and the strengthening of the
economy would simultaneously ensure an opening of the political system. Since
the end of the 1980s, important actors in the international community had begun
a full transformation of its socio-political and economic environment. On the one
hand, almost every single country underwent its own process of integration into
regional market blocs and the creation of a new normative framework, so much so
that almost none of the international actors remained unattached to some form of
geopolitical arrangement.3 On the other hand, international society reached a new
level of organization and an even more autonomous international civil society
emerged, its dynamism enhancing the political presence of a novel and belligerent
international citizenry. Mexico was no exception.
In the context of Mexico’s progress toward a new democratic order, a wide
spectrum of possibilities opened up for the country. One of the most representa-
tive fields where this happened was the international sphere, where old risks were
apparently in the process of being overcome. The new administration’s main
statements from December 1 onward —and even before that, when Fox was still
a presidential candidate— emphasized the need to equate the opening of the
economy and the democratic outcome of the July 2000 elections with citizens’
rights. Moreover, its foreign policy clearly stated that Mexico’s insertion into the
new international reality had to be produced by making respect for human rights
a central component of the democratic project.4 This was one of the avenues for
consolidating the democratic legitimacy obtained at the polls. Thus, the defense
of human rights was both a trigger and a launching pad for democracy. It was also
one of the main steps for enhancing the international legitimacy that the 2000
elections had produced. On the other hand, it embodied a component of an inter-
national trend, from which Mexico could not divorce itself.
Contrary to what had happened in the past when old-guard politicians conceived
of foreign relations from a conventional perspective, during the Fox administration,
foreign policy was intended to be a priority to ensureMexico’s entry into the new cen-
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tury’s globalized order as a dynamic actor capable of presenting itself as a paradigm
of modernity. The Mexican president was supposed to know that the current con-
text of both the continental and international order presented a broad spectrum of
possibilities for this country. Whereas Mexico’s standing within the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) placed it in an even more important position as a
potential Latin American litigant than its peers, the competing middle powers of the
region, Brazil —and to some extent Venezuela— were overtaking the regional stand-
ing that geo-strategically used to belong to the Mexican realm of potentialities.
In this regard, the foreign policy project was designed along two main axes.
Owing to strategic considerations, they deserve prior attention since they are indis-
pensable for Mexico to develop an efficient and relevant foreign policy to address
the country’s real needs. The first is the construction of a strategic relationship with the
United States, and the second, the active participation of Mexico in the configuration
of the new international system. Jorge G. Castañeda, Minister of ForeignAffairs from
2000 to 2003, once and for all unraveled the official vacillation between principles
and interests by stating that what the administration wanted was to ensure the ade-
quate protection and promotion of the country’s interests in the contemporary inter-
national scenario.Within themost rational and realistic paradigm, Jorge G. Castañeda
argued that the two axes were compatible, but above all inseparable because of the
extremely concentrated dependence of the asymmetrical bilateral relationship.5
And yet, the challenge was misunderstood and greatly confused with another
feature of bilateral relations with the United States: namely, the long-standing and
allegedly exceptional friendship-led relationship dominating several of the decisions
and reactions of the overestimated transitional government. All of this eliminated the
possibility of both embracing its domestic momentum of full democratic validation
and taking on the responsibility of reshaping the framework under which Mexican
foreign policy could have better performed its internationalization. Unfortunately
for Fox, this did not happen.
Likewise, Mexico was to be regarded by Canada and the U.S., among other
important actors of the industrialized world, as both an effective and a construc-
tive bridge for drawing the lines of the new regional arrangements. Among the
most relevant topics on the regional agenda were drug smuggling, migration flows,
trade, environmental issues and economic aid. At the same time, the new open-
ing of the international system allowed Mexico to start exploring the possibility of
finding other partnerships beyond the scope of its traditional relationships forged
throughout history with different actors in the hemisphere. It was about devel-
oping closer links with, among others, the countries of the European Union, Asia
and the Middle East, such as Japan and Israel. In this context, Mexico would
develop new trade relations by signing a number of agreements, all of which will
show their real potential for Mexico in the coming years.6
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For the aforementioned reasons, foreign policy became a powerful instrument
of domestic development. A new foreign relations agenda was designed so Mexico
could accomplish this international integration process. In this context, the coun-
try’s democratic legitimacy and, thus, broader room for maneuver posed a four-
fold structural challenge: 1) reinforcing the new domestic democratic reality by
ensuring that transparent local political processes slated for that year and during
the sexenio (Mexico’s six-year presidential term) strengthened the comprehensive
project for political and economic change that ushered Fox into office; 2) as a
result, Mexico was very probably going to play a prominent role in international
affairs, a vision that never materialized. The effects of this engagement in inter-
national politics were going to be at the regional level, the most important goal
being the democratic and economic transformation of the Latin American coun-
tries. By developing an independent and innovative international policy, Mexico
would have the opportunity to become both a bridge for reasonable cooperation
and a containing wall against those interests that threaten its own and the hemi-
spheric priorities; 3) consolidating the basis upon which Mexico had already
established its relative dominance within the regional sphere, such as its partner-
ship both in NAFTA and the potential new Latin American markets that President
Fox announced as priorities for Mexico’s new development goals, and, finally,
4) building a predictable foreign policy, whose strategy could primarily, efficient-
ly match objectives, priorities and outcomes that are both understandable and
easily identified with.
The election of President Vicente Fox usheredMexico into a new era. Democratic
legitimacy presented a wide range of opportunities and responsibilities. The advan-
tages of a democratic transition in a country as complex as Mexico also repre-
sented a myriad of challenges. As was already mentioned, guaranteeing Mexico’s
success in this process required that both the economic and the political variables
coincide —a need that remains to be met. However, the success of the new dem-
ocratic project depended on the following: a) the deepening of a broad democratic
transition; b) the participation of the majority of political actors in this transfor-
mation so that it produced conditions for the emergence of a stable democratic
regime; c) a strong economy; and d) Mexico’s active participation in the increas-
ingly challenging globalized arena vis-à-vis international economic conditions.
These are the challenges I will delve into more deeply theoretically and empiri-
cally in this chapter. Most importantly, I would argue that as much as foreign pol-
icy represents a window of opportunity within a very incomplete democratic
reform process, it has also been an obstacle for accomplishing the democratic gov-
ernment’s most cherished domestic goals,7 to the extent that the intimate link
between domestic and foreign policy created a great crisis of legitimacy in both
fields.
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The Foreign Policy Labyrinth
I should begin by stating —and not even Mexico’s principled foreign policy can
be exempt from this— that neither foreign policy nor the reality surrounding the
strategic decisions taken in defense of national interests is immutable. Foreign
policy must sometimes change its programmatic and basic priorities as changes
occur in history.
Any modern state must design a foreign policy. This stems from the circum-
stances. In the first place, as Lenin once observed, the state is not a cloistered
island, but a member of a society of states in which it inevitably participates. In
the second place, in this society of states, in theory, power should not be central-
ized but distributed among them, not in equal amounts but equitably. While for-
eign policy is similar to any other state activity, such as guaranteeing education
and health services or ensuring law and order, it differs from them to the extent
that the state exercises only imperfect control —if any at all— over the world in
which it lives.
According to Roscoe Pound, domestic policy exerts social control through the
law. Foreign policy, for its part, consists of the use of political influence to get
other states to exercise their executive and legislative power in a way that satisfies
the state in question. At the same time that this consideration is necessary in the
process of any foreign policy, we cannot underestimate the strength of the unpre-
dictable, of what Fisher once called “the play of the contingent and the unfore-
seen.”8 To this, we should add what can only be considered the perverse logic of
international events, the tendency for situations to arise that were not only unan-
ticipated but which the states made all their best efforts to avoid.9
Change or Continuity
What foreign policy is not subject to day-to-day pressures that question even its
historic alliances, the common interests it professes with friendly states and the
sacrifices it can make in the name of accommodating other powers and, in crisis
situations, hostile powers? What foreign policy is not subject to important modi-
fications when a place must be found in the world and the regional concert in the
context of changing its own local political conditions, and of a world transition of
still unsuspected dimensions? The price of foreign policy effectiveness is perma-
nent vigilance against the irremediable changes in world politics. In no other way
can a foreign policy be conceived that is at the same time strategic (visionary and
long-term), pragmatic and resolute (providing concrete solutions to the needs
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posed by world events). In that sense, the question of whether a policy must be
guided by principles —in my opinion, a relatively weak argument— transcends
even the legal and constitutional discussion.10
Nevertheless, it is true that foreign policy is an endless dialogue between the
powers of continuity and the powers of change.11 We have, first of all, the contin-
ued existence through the years of the general aspects of the international system
in which states live and which, sooner or later, their external behavior will help to
configure. Regardless of any Byzantine discussions that may arise, above all in
societies like Mexico’s that have not yet created solid institutional arrangements
to give strength to their economic and political modernization projects, the sur-
prising aspect of states’ encounters with the international system in situations of
low-level, medium-level or radical crisis, is that through time, we find ourselves
adjusting to states’ circumstantial requirements. This may be, for example, by
practicing a balance of power (when dealing with hegemonic or medium-sized
powers) that might counter their ideologies, or by refusing to continue a foreign
policy that ignores universal principles on which its own political genesis should
be based, not to mention the future of its march toward achieving those two elu-
sive spirits: progress and modernity.12
What is more, in this system, geographical space may remain immobile but the
geopolitical scenarios of the different states and their geographical relations have
enormous mobility; certainly technology, social movements, regime changes and
even crises can change the implications of the physical factors and make them
transcend the merely physical frontiers, imposing a transnational character on the
interaction not only among states but also among nations and societies.
This is the case of the relations that develop in the framework of NAFTA and
among European nations, for instance. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out
that it can be the case of societies and nation-states that have been affected by
changes in government and ideology —even revolutionary changes— in which there
are no necessarily substantial modifications in the way their foreign policy is con-
ducted. But here, particularly in this chapter, where we are discussing the basic
aspects of the not-always-felicitous relationship between domestic and foreign
policy, it seems imperative to bring up some of the differences in the functions of
ideology in foreign policy: 1) uniting a country psychologically; 2) offering a scale
of values so people know what to support and what to reject; 3) furnishing a frame
of reference that allows people to become aware of just how disconcerting inter-
national reality can become and to justify government efforts to deal with it, even
through basic changes in strategy; and 4) providing a prism through which states
perceive the international realities their foreign policy must be based on. Without
ideology, a country does not precisely die, but it would be relatively rudderless
when deciding what to approve or disapprove. Conversely, it can be said that in
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ordinary circumstances, we can expect that rational calculations about national
interests and ideological schema go hand in hand; most modern ideologies are
extremely malleable, and even more so when confined to “the international.”13
Changing Foreign Policy Realities and Options
Thus, how is it that, if everything is fixed and orderly in foreign policy, a govern-
ment or state of any size can be a free agent or actor in the execution of its inter-
national policy? In any case, we can say that, historically, policy makers have
found that their options are predetermined at the domestic policy level, yes, but
to a much greater extent in international matters, even more than they perceived
or rationally calculated before taking office. This does not mean that foreign pol-
icy makers do not make mistakes in the course of their rational deliberations, all
of which is implicit in the implementation of (foreign) policies and can hardly be
fully understood —and is sometimes even underestimated— by most of the pub-
lic. As a matter of fact, in a democracy, state policies are not exactly fashioned to
be understood by a broad public, although they do require a sphere of legitimacy
that rests on the institutional organization of an institutionalized government —
whether firmly institutionalized or not— that all modern states and societies
should have, to allow for subtle conditions for preservation and preventing risks.
However, the freedom that does matter in foreign policy questions —and weighs
critically in most cases— is the ability to decide among relatively few options. A
recurring image for illustrating this reasoning is a card game. Just like in cards,
the government’s hand is a result of the circumstances: there is no freedom to play
a card that you do not have in your hand; of the cards in your hand, there are
always one or perhaps two that are the “right” card to play at that stage of the game.
It is the “right” one in the sense that when the game is over and all the hands are
face up on the table (and part of the story reconstructed), that card was the right
one to play under the circumstances, with the understanding that the player was
ready to win the game. The reason the player makes a mistake by not playing the
decisive card at the decisive moment can be because of personality, political or
religious beliefs or his/her partisan loyalties, or because of a lack of ideally perfect
information. But in my opinion, there is no doubt that there is a decisive card,
whose identity is not governed by the player’s personal traits, but by the very way
the game is going, its rhythm. The game generates a “climate” or “climates” in which
concrete policies develop and force decisions that are not always subject to the
rigor of consensus: they are decisions that in a democratic environment stem from
a legitimate power whose responsibility is to act, first with a sense of commitment
to the obligations assumed in the international sphere and, second, that require,
of course, a statesman’s vision.
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Mexican Foreign Policy Objectives
And Times of Transition
What, then, is foreign policy? What do governments seek from it? In effect, it
must be assumed that foreign policy stems from the intimate interaction between
the internal and the external. It is a matter of defending interests more than of
national interests —interests that are served or interests that must wait to be sat-
isfied; not all interests are satisfied. It is a matter of the representation of inter-
ests emblematic of the national ethos. This is, I believe, the basis that motivates
the work of a leader in foreign policy: principles are insinuated through political
representation, and national interests are fulfilled in the light of a political reality.
In a liberal democracy such as the one Mexico is trying with great difficulties
to achieve and consolidate, the debate centers on what interests are defensible
and which, if necessary, can be sacrificed. All of this happens in the framework of
the implementation of foreign policy. The question is 1) whether some interests
are going to be damaged, and 2) which interests they should be. The hierarchy of
interests that a government tries to defend or refuses to decline is based on desires,
needs and a state’s demands in the international order, and on a national consensus
that is sufficiently firm so as to support and sustain leaders whose responsibility
is to represent the state in international policy.
In the framework of globalization, the state must reorganize itself and therefore
also the social relations that constitute it, so that these lost ties of the state com-
munity are reconstructed. External sovereignty cannot represent a state before the
rest of the states if the state does not recognize itself and define its personality and
sense of identity. It must be strong from within in order to be able to defend its
national interests in an interdependent world, and simultaneously, it must recog-
nize the rights of the rest of the states that make up international society. The cur-
rent challenge for each national state is to strengthen internal sovereignty.
Recent social phenomena, the transformation of national and international
relations and the reorganization of the economy and society undoubtedly show us
that in the last 20 years the world has become a different place. To paraphrase
Zaki Laïdi, globalization has turned into an important social representation of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.14 Globalization is a socio-political phenom-
enon related to the end of the Cold War: after the fall of the Soviet Union, it
emerged as the triumph of the democratic-liberal model. It has included the uni-
versalization of certain ideological, cultural and value models like those identified
with the principles of democracy and liberalism. In addition, it is commonly
understood as the transition between the reunification of the world and the dis-
appearance of national borders; it is related to processes of regionalization, cul-
tural harmonization and the transformation of the national state.
Globalization and recent political changes bring us face to face with a vast his-
torical and cultural diversity not explicable in the usual way. These changes have
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generated transformations in all spheres of human relations and in the dynamics
of international society, which in turn spur the creation of new theories to explain
and make reasonable order out of these new international social configurations.
The nature of the “new world order” is by no means obvious. With the end of
the Cold War, political expectations were dashed, as were models that explained
the bi-polar order and attempted to sketch its possible future (very often from uni-
formity, like “real socialism”). What is certain is that the transition from the old
bi-polar order to this new order caused disquiet and academic and political uncer-
tainty about whether theoretical elements are still valid or if others need to be incor-
porated.
After the end of the bi-polar order, all states have redefined their place in the
new international configuration. Basic concepts like sovereignty, independence,
national interest and national and international security have changed as the
objectives they pursue also changed. Formulation and execution of the national
foreign policies should therefore be designed accordingly.
The Mexican Paradox
For the first time in the history of Mexico since the Mexican Revolution, foreign
policy has acquired great importance and transcendence and has been more
closely linked to the success of domestic policy. For the last two presidential
terms, Mexico had sought to be present in and participate more in multilateral
discussions and negotiations for a simple reason, which, although not the only
one, was perhaps a kind of catalyst: the economy became the central focus of
Mexican international policy. As the country internationalized, the government
had to abandon its “anti-U.S.” stance, opt for cooperation instead of conflict and
forge a partnership mainly in economic but also in political terms with the United
States and Canada. The partnership-building process required a broader defini-
tion of the Mexican foreign policy paradigm and of the national perception of the
interests it wanted to pursue as an active international actor. The undeniable fact
is that the partnership was a demand that came from the de facto integration that
has always exceeded the institutional framework of the North American bloc. The
most representative —though not very successful— outcome of this new institu-
tionalized interconnectedness is the proposal for creating a sphere of cooperation
under the principle of policy unification and coordination to promote regional
security and prosperity (the SPP). This partnership can be praised as a successful
outcome for U.S. foreign policy that advanced—and up to a certain point imposed—
its national interest to protect U.S. citizens, notwithstanding the fact that Mexico
or Canada would need to include other elements to defend their security in the
region.
Despite the fact that foreign policy has changed in practice, its discussion has
been postponed. This is why the legal principles that frame the formulation and
execution of Mexico’s foreign policy are becoming more and more incongruous
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with time.15 The aforementioned principles are contained in Article 89 of the Mex-
ican Constitution since the reform of 1988, and refer to the guiding foreign poli-
cy principles that the chief executive should implement:16
1) Non-intervention;
2) The self-determination of nations;
3) A peaceful solution to controversy;
4) The elimination of threats or the use of force in international relations;
5) The legal equality of states;
6) International cooperation for development; and
7) The fight for peace and international security.17
Furthermore, the much sought-after reform should go beyond the debate on
principles and strategies and contemplate the broad, effective participation of all
actors involved in Mexico’s foreign policy-making process (i.e. the president, Con-
gress, political parties, civil society, the private and academic sectors, etc.). What ini-
tially was interpreted as a rather generalized consensus could have been more
accurately characterized as a lack of interest on the part of other actors and an
executive branch monopoly in the field.18 Only a small governmental elite partic-
ipated in this decision making, thus rendering the democratic foreign policy
process precarious. For example, traditionally, the executive has had greater power
over the formulation of foreign policy than the legislature, even though Congress
—and exclusively the Senate— is the body that constitutionally should sanction
the decisions previously made by the executive branch.19 This subordination was
a direct result of Congress’s lack of political independence and the over-concen-
tration of information in the executive branch. To a great extent, it evinced one of
the structural problems of the Mexican political regime: that is, the absence of a
coherent and consistent balance of power.
As the twentieth century advanced and the international context changed, the
incompatibility of those principles became increasingly evident. The Mexican gov-
32 JOSÉ LUIS VALDÉS-UGALDE
15 See Humberto Garza Elizondo, “Los cambios en la política exterior de México, 1989-1994,” Foro
Internacional, no. XXXIV (October-December 1994): 534-544.
16 These principles are inserted in a multitude of international instruments that Mexico is a part of,
having subscribed, approved, ratified and adhered to them: the Charter of the Organization of Ame-
rican States (ratified November 23, 1948) reformed by the Buenos Aires Protocol of 1967, and by
the Cartagena of Indias Protocol of 1985; UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (October 24,
1975) containing the Declaration on Principles of International LawConcerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. See Edmundo
Hernández-Vela Salgado, Diccionario de política internacional, 5th ed. (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1999).
17 Alonso Gómez Robledo Verduzco, “Mexican Foreign Policy: its Fundamental Principles”,Mexican Law
Review no. 3 (January-June 2005) IIJ-UNAM, at http://info8.juridicas.unam.mx/cont/3/arc /arc5.htm.
18 See Rafael Velázquez Flores, Factores, bases y fundamentos de la política exterior de México (Mexico
City: Plaza y Valdés, 2007).
19 See Articles 73 and 76 of the Mexican Constitution in Secretaría de Gobernación, Constitución
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ernment used foreign policy doctrine with increasing discretion to present itself
as a relatively weak country that had to resort to the law to defend itself from exter-
nal intervention. Nevertheless, for a long time, and despite being an anachronism,
the principle of non-intervention and the Estrada Doctrine20 basically made it
possible for the Mexican government, through a very intelligent maze of relation-
ships and complicities, to be authoritarian without any international ally being
able or wanting to intercede. In some cases, explicit accords were established, like
in the case of Cuba, not to intervene in each others’ internal affairs in exchange
for mutual support to further both countries’ authoritarian political models. Mex-
ico’s ambivalence, expressed through the so-called “agreement to disagree,”21 shap-
ed Mexico-U.S. relations for decades, in the sense that it was the only arrangement
that allowed a margin of relative independence for Mexico regarding the United
States in foreign policy implementation, without endangering Mexico’s most impor-
tant bilateral relationship, and without officially compromising with any of the
parties involved. Despite this, Mexico intervened actively in the Central American
process in the 1980s and before that, in the Chilean events of 1973. It was a rela-
tively comfortable foreign policy —although at the same time it had two faces— for
an authoritarian regime that cautiously used it as a smoke screen to hide the enor-
mous socio-political contradictions inside the country.
In that sense, Mexico’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, depends
on the international conditions of the state in question, but also on the interna-
tional historic environment and context. Domestic political conditions have chang-
ed gradually in recent years, and, as I already mentioned, the year of democratic
alternation in office, beginning in July 2000, was particularly important. Some
political actors’ attempts to defend a supposed tradition that they think is idealis-
tic, legal and principle-based are surprising, however, and they fight for its con-
tinued implementation arguing that continuity is a sign of effectiveness, owing to
the apparent status in the international arena thatMexico used to enjoy. Nevertheless,
if one of international society’s characteristics is dynamism, it is also reasonable
to say that foreign policy changes in accordance with international politics,
adjusting itself to historical circumstances to be effective.
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In a complex, conflictive, permanently changing world, a policy emphasizing tradition
and continuity (unchanging principles and objectives) as its most outstanding traits
could well be a policy that lags behind and is not very flexible. A policy that does not
change and better itself is a rigid, old-fashioned policy that will not march to the rhythm
of global change.22
Mexico’s traditional foreign policy model has changed in practice without this
being recognized in discourse or in theory. For that reason, I will mention some of
the most noteworthy components of today’s Mexican foreign policy:
1) Nationalism has been replaced by internationalism;
2) Independence has been replaced by interdependence;
3) Principles have been replaced by interests;
4) Legalism and symbolism have been replaced by pragmatism;
5) Idealism has been replaced by realism;
6) Being unrelated to domestic policy has been replaced by the effective linkage to
domestic policy; and
7) Passiveness has been replaced by activity.
The internationalism and activity that Mexico tried to exhibit during the first
democratic administration was clear in several efforts to exert international lead-
ership, the climax of which was its period as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council in 2002-2003. Other efforts that presented the new face of its
pro-active foreign policy were the launching of the Puebla Panama Plan; the can-
didacy of Ernesto Derbez, Minister of Foreign Relations, for general secretary of
the Organization of American States; the hosting of several international confer-
ences; and the campaign for United Nations reform. Regarding the latter, Mexico
pushed an agenda completely motivated by national interests when in April 2004,
the president launched the Group of Friends for the Reform of the United Nations,
aiming to reach “an integral understanding of the reform process that would allow
the United Nations to address the most delicate challenges and threats of each
historical cycle, not focusing exclusively on the composition of the Security Coun-
cil.”23 However, it was Mexico’s proposal to enlarge the Security Council that overt-
ly demonstrated its competition with Brazil for the prize of regional leadership.
Mexico tried to make its commitment to multilateralism as clear as possible, as
well as the effort to distance itself somewhat from the traditional associations the
international community used to take for granted, such as the unspoken agreement
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de México ante Naciones Unidas, Grupo de amigos de la reforma de las Naciones Unidas, at http://
www.un.int/mexico/index_reform.htm.
with Cuba during the annual human rights condemnation and the idea of being
subordinated to U.S. foreign policy interests —the greatest show of intended dis-
tancing was Mexico’s refusal to acquiesce to the Iraq invasion. At the same time,
Mexico was advancing its perceived national interests, frequently through very
thoughtless pragmatism that could have been mistaken for historic indifference,
diplomatic lack of concern and fragmented maneuvers. The pursuit of the “whole
enchilada” is the case that best portrays this new foreign policy framework in
which interests are prioritized, principles disregarded and policies are randomly
adjusted as a simple reaction to contingencies.24
The component highlighting the alleged effective linkage to domestic policy
must be nuanced: effectiveness depends on the sphere of action, self-evaluation,
the domestic and international impact of the recognition of areas of concern and, for
some specific cases, the degree of cooperation of the transnational partner. In the
fight against drug-trafficking, domestic policy went hand-in-hand with U.S. security
demands and the international condemnation of organized crime. In contrast, the
migratory issue involved several inconsistencies: first, since domestic policy is still
behind in recognizing Mexico’s responsibility for the push factors of migration, and,
secondly, there is no migration policy that would finally deal with the impressive
incoherence between the abandoned southern border and the overexposed northern
border realities. The national human rights deficit that the Mexican government
recently has openly condemned in multilateral forums also must not be forgotten.
It is not that Mexico’s foreign policy was not realistic, pragmatic and active or
that it did not take into account and act in accordance with specific interests.
What should be recognized is exactly the opposite: that is, that it did do all of this,
but covertly, always behind a “neutral” and—why not say it?— simulated discourse
and as the offspring of a frankly worn out —if not decomposed— post-revolution-
ary regime. It is time to make what is happening in practice unreservedly legiti-
mate and legal.
Historically, it has been said that there was a contradiction between the prin-
ciples and interests of Mexican foreign policy, despite this vision expressing a
false dichotomy that in turn stems from an erroneous idea of international socie-
ty (which, by the way, permeates the legislature today): it is believed to be static
and that, therefore, it acts in accordance with a pre-established order that has
predetermined the social and political roles of the states that make up interna-
tional society. While it is true that developing countries do not have the same
power of negotiation as developed countries, this idea should be rethought to assume
that principles and interests are compatible with each other if they are put for-
ward coherently in an interdependent and interconnected world. The use of the
law and of principles of doctrine in favor of internal development is not opposed
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to their defense in international forums through the promotion and proposal of
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral initiatives.
Principles of doctrine help as counterweights to the inequalities among states,
but are insufficient to fully exercise foreign policy for two reasons: 1) it would be
very hard to disagree with them since Mexican foreign policy principles are the
same as those of international law, and, therefore, they are general and inflexible;
and 2) they can be used to explain and argue a kind of behavior that they can,
however, only justify post-factum.25
It is a good idea to clearly and openly incorporate a dose of realism into the
exercise of foreign policy to avert the ambiguity in which Mexico has historically
been situated (being in everything and with everyone, but not in favor of or against
anything or anybody) and define national interests, and that policy’s priorities and
objectives. We should clarify that when we talk about realism, we are not refer-
ring to the type of policy conceived of as the exercise of power with no ideals or
values, using fraud and implemented mercilessly. As Giovanni Sartori says, this is
a mistaken conception:
Political realism is not what it is erroneously supposed to be. It is not a kind of self-
sufficient policy, something that can agree with or oppose the systems we call dem-
ocratic, socialist or others. In this continuum, there is no place for political realism
for the simple reason that it is only one element, one ingredient of each and every
one of the political positions. Every accurately descriptive explanation is a realistic
explanation, which is the same as saying that realism only leads us to the antecham-
ber of policy. Policy requires information; it needs to know reality and this is what
political realism brings to the mix, but it does so to the benefit of all and not of a
single side.26
The conviction that the application of international law is fundamental in the
development of international policy must be preserved and, what is more, vali-
dated in states’ domestic policies, and, more specifically in Mexico, imbuing inter-
national treaties (such as those referring to human rights) with the weight of the
law and enforcing them in society. However, the fact that there are no private polit-
ical interests often contrary to what is established in international law should not
be disregarded, and, precisely for that reason, active participation in multilateral
forums must be a constant. Although facts and values —understood as what they
are and what they should be— are reciprocally related, we should not forget that
they are two independent spheres that complement each other.
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We must not make the mistake of using a fact to refute a value or, vice-versa, using a
deontology to reject a manifestation of fact…. We must not fall into the mistake of
believing that the entire case can be presented in terms of a description of reality or, to
the contrary, in terms of value judgments. I mean that to encompass the entire field of
politics, we need both facts and ideals.27
Conclusion
Domestic political change cannot be divorced from the changing international
process. In the entire world, foreign policies have adapted themselves to the chang-
ing times of international reality and, to a great extent, NAFTA shows this. The pre-
eminence of the globalized era over these policies has given states no rest. The
states, for their part, have gone through an important process of transformation
to which they have convened, more or less rationally, their societies.
What is a historic fact is that in the last two decades, foreign policy issues have
had an increasing impact on domestic policy. Domestic policy, foreign policy and
international policy are three different moments of a single process. Thus, it is also
true that domestic policy generates a great number of the issues and problems that
are later transferred to the arena of foreign policy. This is why it is said that domes-
tic and foreign policies are increasingly interrelated, and, in addition to not being
really separable, are strategic components of a long-term state policy.
For analysts, but mainly for political actors directly involved in decision making,
it is of the utmost importance to understand this unity and its meaning in the defense
of national interests. What is more, it is of considerable significance that, regardless of
political or ideological differences, legislators and federal officials agree on state
strategies, forging a consensus about the steps for carrying out a foreign policy proj-
ect that was offered to society. All the actors involved are responsible for articulating
this project, sorting out their political differences —they are, after all, professional
politicians— and achieving a consensus as a point of departure. It is my impression
that nowadays, none of the political parties or political actors is sufficiently clear on
these ideas. Their legislators’ behavior vis-à-vis foreign policy issues gives the impres-
sion that they lack a clear vision: both of a national and a foreign policy project. It
would seem that they are still moving among the old models of international relations
—which up to a certain point is explicable— and the reality I have already described.
That is, politicians seem to lack strategic vision. This, on the other hand, stems from
the lack of professionalism that has dominated the legislature, partly because of the
absence of a professional civic class that can teach them about the country’s most
important issues, and partly because legislators themselves are novices in the mat-
ters they must deal with during their terms. In this sense, it would seem to be even
clearer that what is needed is to overcome the three major political parties’ conser-
vative resistance to constitutional reform and re-election.28 Here, and of course in the
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consciousness and principles of party doctrine, is where the parties are most back-
ward in assuming responsibility for foreign policy in accordance with the new, already
stormy, times that our country has to face. Undoubtedly, this scenario has an impact
on the future of Mexico’s international relations, and it has also negatively impacted,
within the realm of NAFTA, our country’s complex bilateral and trilateral relations.
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Appendix 1
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY MEXICO
Agreement Country Date Published Entry into Force
NAFTA United States December 20, January 1, 1994
and Canada 1993
G3  FTA Colombia and January 9, 1995 January 1, 1995
Venezuela *
Mexico-Costa Rica FTA Costa Rica January 10, 1995 January 1, 1995
Mexico-Bolivia FTA Bolivia January 11, 1995 January 1, 1995
Mexico-Nicaragua FTA Nicaragua July 1, 1998 July 1, 1998
Mexico-Chile FTA Chile July 28, 1999 August 1, 1999
Mexico-EU FTA European Union June 26, 2000 July 1, 2000
Mexico-Israel FTA Israel June 28, 2000 July 1, 2000
Mexico-Northern El Salvador, March 14, 2001 March 15, 2001
Triangle FTA Guatemala and with El Salvador
Honduras and Guatemala, 
and June 1, 2001, 
with Honduras.
Mexico-European Free Iceland, Norway, June 29, 2001 July 1, 2001
Trade Association  FTA Liechtenstein and
Switzerland
Mexico-Uruguay  FTA Uruguay July 14, 2004 July 15, 2004
Mexico-Japan Agreement Japan March 31, 2005 April 1, 2005
of Economic Association 
* As of November 19, 2006, only Mexico and Colombia participate in the FTA with the G3.
Source: Free Trade Agreements signed by Mexico, Vice Ministry for International Commercial Negotiations,
Ministry of the Economy, http://www.economia.gob.mx/work/snci/negociaciones/ficha_ publica_ tlcs.
htm; accessed June 20, 2008.
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Appendix 2 
AGREEMENTS FOR MUTUAL PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
OF INVESTMENT SIGNED BY MEXICO
Country Date Signed Date Ratified Date Published Entry into Force
by the Senate
Argentina November 13, April 24, 1997 August 28, 1998 July 22, 1998
1996
Australia August 23, February 21, June 12, 2007 July 18, 2007
2005 2006
Austria June 29, December 14, March 23, 2001 March 26, 2001
1998 1998
Belgium-Lux August 27, December 14, March 19, 2003 March 20, 2003
Union 1998 1998
China July 11, 2008 Pending Pending Pending
Cuba May 30, 2001 December 11, May 3, 2002 March 29, 2002
2001
Czech April 4, 2002 October 29, 2002 March 25, 2004 March 14, 2004
Republic
Denmark April 13, 2000 April 28, 2000 November 30, September 23,
2000 2000
Finland February 22, April 17, November 30, August 21,
1999 2000 2000 2000
France November 12, April 17, November 30, October 11,
1998 2000 2000 2000
Germany August 25,1998 December 14, March 20, 2001 February 23, 
1998 2001
Greece November 30, April 26, October 11, September 17,
2000 2001 2002 2002
Iceland June 24, December 6, June 6, April 28,
2005 2005 2006 2006
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Appendix 2 
AGREEMENTS FOR MUTUAL PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
OF INVESTMENT SIGNED BY MEXICO (CONTINUE)
Country Date Signed Date Ratified Date Published Entry into Force
by the Senate
India May 21, December 11, March 5, February 23,
2007 2007 2008 2008
Italy November 24, April 17, January 17, December 4, 
1999 2000 2003 2002
Korea November 14, April 16, 2002 August 9, 2002 June 28, 2002
2000
Netherlands May 13, December 14, July 10, October 1,
1998 1998 2000 1999
Panama October 11, April 4, December 19, December 14, 
2005 2006 2006 2006
Portugal November 11, April 17, January 8, September 4, 
1999 2000 2001 2000
Spain June 22, 1995 November 16, March 19, 1997 December 18,
October 10, 1995 1996
2006* April 26, 2007* May 19, 2008* April 4, 2008*
Slovakia October 26, 2007 Pending Pending Pending
Sweden October 3, 2000 April 3, 2001 July 27, 2001 July 1, 2001
Switzerland July 10, 1995 November 16, 1995 August 20, 1998 March 11, 1996
Trinidad October 3, March 6, September 12, September 16,
and Tobago 2006 2007 2007 2007
United May 12, 2006 April 26, 2007 July 25, 2007 July 25, 2007
Kingdom 
Uruguay June 30, December 11, August 9, 2002 July 1, 2002
1999 1999
* Dates corresponding to the renegotiated agreement.
Source: Status of the Agreements for Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment signed by
Mexico, Office of Foreign Investment, Ministry of the Economy, http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=
1210, accessed June 25, 2008. Updated January 2009.
